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1. Introduction 
Model checking can provide important information on the failures of digital instrumentation and 
control (I&C) systems and its software in particular. Due to the nature of software, it doesn’t 
wear or tear in time similar to hardware. Software failures are design failures, which are 
triggered by the combination of internal memory state of system and the system’s inputs. 
Software failures are typically rare and hard to predict and identify. They are mainly caused by 
systematic (i.e. design specification or modification) faults, and not by random errors. The 
systematic nature of software failures, i.e. the same failure can be triggered in similar systems 
simultaneously, makes their study particularly important in the context of probabilistic risk 
assessments (PRA) and nuclear safety. 
In model checking, a model of I&C system’s application logic is created to formally verify the 
correct functioning of a system model by examining all of its possible behaviours. The 
approach can be valuable in discovering complex scenarios. Therefore, model checking can 
provide important support for the definition of failure modes in the software failure modelling of 
PRA. 
The integration of model checking with PRA modelling has been studied previously in two 
separate case studies presented in [1] and [2]. In this report, an overview to the common 
taxonomy of failure modes and current practices of modelling digital I&C systems in PRA is 
given. The results of the case studies are analysed and the findings are reflected to the current 
modelling practices. Based on the findings a discussion is given on how the model checking 
could benefit the PRA and its taxonomy, and how the integration of the two modelling methods 
should be focused in the future research. 
The report is composed as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction to the common taxonomy 
of failure modes of digital I&C systems and the current practices of modelling digital I&C 
systems in PRA. Section 3 describes the model checking method and its previous coupling 
with PRA. Section 4 compares the design issues identified in previous VTT customer projects 
to the taxonomy of software failure modes and effects. Section 5 discusses the previous 
coupling results and highlights topics for the potential complementary uses of the methods in 
the future. Section 6 is left for conclusions. 
2. Current practice of modelling digital I&C in PRA 
2.1 Common taxonomy of failure modes for digital I&C systems 
In [3], a common taxonomy of failure modes for digital I&C systems is presented. The 
taxonomy has been developed in DIGREL project by Working Group on Risk Assessment 
(WGRISK) of OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, and it is seen as an important step towards 
standardised digital I&C modelling and reliability analysis techniques for PRA. 
Needs from PRA have guided the development work, meaning e.g. that the digital system and 
its failures are studied from their functional significance point of view. The taxonomy is 
deliberately focused on the reliability analysis of the reactor protection system, which reduces 
the scope of failure modes and failure effects considerably. 
The summary presented in [4] is used to give a short introduction to the taxonomy, and in 
particular, to the failure mode part of the taxonomy. The taxonomy is based on a hierarchical 
definition of five levels of abstraction: 1) system level, 2) division level, 3) I&C unit level, 4) I&C 
unit modules level, 5) basic components level. The different levels and examples of their 
entities in nuclear safety I&C are demonstrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Different levels of abstraction for nuclear safety I&C. 
The taxonomy is developed using a specific conceptual model of failure and failure 
propagation. The failure model and the taxonomy consist of the following elements: fault 
location, failure mode, uncovering situation, failure effect and the end effect. 
These elements are used to define the relationship between a fault in hardware or software 
modules (module level failure modes) and the end effect on I&C units (I&C unit level failure 
modes). In the analysis, a fault is postulated in a hardware or software module (fault location). 
For hardware modules, different failure modes are explicitly defined. Software module failure 
modes are directly associated with the failure effect. Uncovering situation describes when, 
where and how the module failure is significant at the I&C unit level. A taxonomy of generic 
failure effects is defined to provide a simple but exhaustive way to categorise the effect of 
wrong output in a module.  
The end effect describes the final propagation of the failure, taking into consideration all these 
elements of the failure model. In this consideration, a distinction can be made between the 
“maximum possible end effect”, when fault tolerance design (FTD) is not effective or does not 
exist, and the “most likely end effect”, assumes that FTD features are present and effective. 
FTD is effective only when the fault is detected by online monitoring, which is one of the 
uncovering situation categories. 
2.2 Failure modes on different levels of abstraction 
The safety-related function of the system is defined as the generation of safety-related 
actuation signal in a predefined time interval only when required. An output of the system is a 
set of outputs of the divisions. Thus, the failure modes in the division level are similar with 
those of the system level, and therefore the failure modes on the system and division level 
can be defined as: 
 Failure to actuate the function (including late actuation); 
 Spurious actuation. 
 
For the functional impacts of I&C units a difference is distinguished between the impact on a 
single I&C unit and impact on multiple I&C units. The latter is especially important when 
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analysing the impacts of software faults (systematic fault in the design). From a single I&C unit 
point of view, the following functional failure modes on the I&C unit level can be considered: 
 Loss of all functions (outputs) of the I&C unit; 
 Loss of a specific function; 
 Spurious output (all functions); 
 Spurious output (one function). 
 
The above list is not exhaustive, and e.g. for voting units the functional end effect may be more 
complex (e.g. degraded voting logic).  
At the module level, a distinction is made between the treatment of hardware and software 
related failure modes. Typical examples of failure modes for hardware and software 
modules are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, which have been collected from the taxonomy 
working group members (see appendix of [3]). 
At the basic component level, with regarding to the hardware of basic components, the 
assessment of failure modes and effects is similar to the module level assessment. In most 
cases, module level assessment is sufficient. Basic component level may be needed if failure 
data is available at that level and if basic components form CCF groups which are not covered 
by module level CCF groups. 
With regarding to the software of basic components, the module level as defined above is the 
most detailed level of abstraction considered. The next level would be the line of codes, which 
are both far too detailed elements for any reliability analysis and also practically non-accessible 
for the analysts. 
2.3 Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
An important part of a system analysis in developing a reliability model is performance of an 
FMEA. The results of the FMEA can provide a basis of the associated reliability model, such 
as a (system) fault tree model to be part of the plant-specific PRA. The FMEA would provide 
the relationships between the system level failure modes and more detailed level failure 
modes, fault tolerance design features, and dependencies (including possibly plant processes 
and operator actions). 
FMEA for reactor protection system can be developed e.g. in the following levels: 
 the actuators (pumps, valves, diesel generators, etc.); 
 I&C units and communication links; 
 I&C functions; 
 hardware and software modules of I&C units. 
 
FMEA for the actuators is carried out in standard manner as part of the process system 
FMEAs. In this analysis the critical actuation signals and associated DC power supply 
dependencies need to be identified. The analysis shall provide link to the I&C units and I&C 
functions controlling the actuator. 
In the FMEA for I&C units (e.g. VUs and APUs), power supply, the I&C functions, modules and 
communication links are identified. Analysis of I&C functions shall identify associated I&C units 
and software modules for each function. Fail-safe principles can be identified in this context. 
 RESEARCH REPORT VTT-R-00017-20
6 (18)
 
 
Table 1: Failure modes and failure effects of hardware modules collected from different 
taxonomies. 
I&C module 
output 
Module types Failure modes Failure effect 
I&C modules 
with digital 
outputs 
Digital input modules, 
digital output modules 
Hang, Crash (no output) Fatal failure 
Output* fails to 1 
Output fails to 0 
Output stuck to current value 
Output fails to the opposite state 
Delayed output 
Random output 
Non-fatal failure 
Processing module Hang, crash (no output) Fatal failure 
Wrong output 
Delayed output 
Random output 
Other failure modes depending 
on the platform 
Non-fatal failure 
Digital communication 
modules 
Failure modes are protocol 
dependent 
Protocol dependent 
I&C modules 
with analog 
outputs 
Analog input modules, 
analog output modules 
Hang, crash (no output) Fatal failure 
Output fails to MAX Non-fatal failure 
Output fails to MIN/0 Non-fatal failure 
Output fails to an erroneous 
value (out of range) 
Delayed output 
Random output (output 
fluctuates, in range, between 
minimal and maximal value) 
Non-fatal failure 
Drifted output (output is x% 
more than actual value) 
Non-significant or non-
functional effect; with 
plausible or implausible 
behaviour 
*Output can be a single output, several outputs or all outputs of the module, which needs to be specified in the 
failure analysis. 
 
Table 2: Failure modes and failure effects of software modules collected from different 
taxonomies. 
Module types Failure modes Failure effect 
System software (SyS) Hang, crash (no output).  
 For example: Software stuck in an infinite loop, 
divisions by zero or illegal access to memory (e.g., 
writes to ROM or read/writes to inexistent memory 
addresses), attempt to use illegal instruction, 
access to invalid data or code, attempt of operation 
not allowed in the current CPU mode 
 These failures are trapped by the microprocessor 
exception features  
Fatal failure 
Elementary functions 
(EF), application specific 
software (AS), functional 
requirements 
specification (FRS) 
Hang, crash (no output). Fatal failure 
Output* fails to 1 
Output fails to 0 
Output stuck to current value 
Output fails to the opposite state 
Delayed output 
Random output 
Non-fatal failure 
Digital communication 
modules (DCS, DLC) 
Failure modes are protocol dependent Protocol dependent 
Proprietary modules 
(COTS-SW) 
Failure modes are function dependent Function dependent 
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FMEA for hardware and software modules can be performed in a generic manner. Failure 
modes and effects are module type specific but otherwise generic. With regard to the input 
and output modules, allocation of I&C functions between the modules and even the channels 
of the modules should be identified. This is needed for the determination of the test interval of 
the input and output modules. 
2.4 Comparative study on digital I&C modelling approaches for PRA 
A comparative study on the digital I&C modelling approaches for PRA has been initiated in 
DIGMAP project by WGRISK. The project started in 2017 and is expected to conclude in 2020. 
Participating countries include Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Finland, Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and Czech Republic.  
The objective of DIGMAP project [5] is to compare modelling approaches used in the 
participating countries for safety-important digital I&C systems in an example NPP. The 
example NPP description is developed based on the descriptions of DIGREL project [3]. The 
model is a fictive boiling water reactor (BWR) with simplified systems except for the more 
detailed digital I&C description. Each participant is expected to develop an own digital I&C 
PRA model based on the provided system layout of the example NPP. The PRA models are 
benchmarked for the loss of main feed-water accident. The different models will be shared, 
discussed and compared. Through the comparisons valuable insights for the future modelling 
method development can be identified. These insights concern e.g. methods, the level of detail 
applied and quantification issues. 
3. Model checking method and previous coupling with PRA 
3.1 Model checking method 
Model checking [6] is a computer aided formal verification method for the verification of 
hardware or software systems. In model checking, a desired property is verified over a system 
model. The main benefit of model checking is that model checking tools are able to perform 
an exhaustive verification with respect to desired property. Given the model and the formalised 
requirements as input, a model-checker automatically determines whether the system has 
violated its requirements. If a system model fails to satisfy a desired property, the model 
checker will give a counter-example that demonstrates a behaviour that violates the property. 
Practical application of I&C system model checking in the Finnish nuclear industry is discussed 
in [7].  
Model checking has been proven an effective method, when focusing on the I&C software, 
alone. The exhaustive analysis reveals unlikely and complex scenarios, involving unlikely 
operator behaviour, unusual feedback from the process, and/or very exact timing of unrelated 
events [7]. However, in order to analyse failure tolerance, different failure modes of the 
underlying I&C hardware would need to be included in the model. Different approaches for 
modelling hardware failures have been suggested (e.g., [8],[9]), but there remain questions 
about the scalability of such approaches for very large and complex models. 
3.2 Coupling of model checking with PRA 
The coupling of model checking methodology with PRA has been studied in case studies 
presented in [1] and [2]. In [1], a concept-level coupling approach is developed. The coupling 
approach is illustrated in Figure 2. The main idea of the approach is that the model checking 
analysis is restricted to a smaller set of postulated component failures, based on PRA results. 
This aims to improve the scalability of model checking. Performing exhaustive model checking 
for a digital instrumentation and control (I&C) system, when both hardware failures and the 
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detailed functionality of the I&C system are considered, can be challenging due to scalability 
issues. 
 
Figure 2. An approach for integration of model checking and PRA. 
PRA is first used to calculate minimal cut sets (MCS) of the system. Based on the minimal cut 
sets, verification is performed using model checking. The verification is performed from several 
points of view. If all failures belonging to a MCS are assumed, it is expected that the checked 
property (e.g. success criterion) is not fulfilled. For example, for the case study system of [1] 
the model-checking success criterion is interpreted as follows: “If the water level is below the 
low limit, the valve is closed.” If the model checker does not confirm this, it is likely because of 
an error in the PRA model (or the model-checking model). 
If only a subset the components in an MCS is assumed failed, the success criterion should be 
fulfilled. If this is not the case, the model checker will produce a counter-example scenario. 
The counter-example will show how the combination of application software behaviour, 
together with the assumed component failures, can cause the success criterion to fail. If such 
a scenario is found using model checking, the risk importance of the scenario should be 
analysed. Also the PRA model should be changed to accommodate for the scenario. 
Alternatively, if the scenario is severe, it should lead to a system design revision. 
According to [1], the proposed approach can be used for: 1) identifying spurious failures 
manifested during hardware failures; 2) verifying the fault-tolerance of a system; 3) identifying 
new scenarios in which a safety function of the plant is not adequately performed; and 4) 
finding errors in the PRA model. 
To demonstrate the usability of the developed coupling approach, the first case study was 
performed in [1] for a simple feedwater tank system. The approach was tested for a larger 
system in the second case study in [2]. The larger system represents a model of fictive, 
simplified boiling water reactor (BWR). The larger model incorporates the possibility to divide 
the system into sub-systems that can be analysed individually. 
3.3 Results of the previous case studies 
The results of the first case study indicated that the model checking enabled the discovery of 
a set of previously unknown failure scenarios in the example I&C system. The scenarios 
occurred due to different hardware errors in combination with a software design error that was 
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not accounted for in the PRA model. From the scalability point of view the small-scale case 
study on the approach seemed quite promising. 
It should be, however, noted that the results of a PRA model are always the product of 
identified failure modes of the modelled system and its components. Therefore, a PRA model 
cannot create MCS for failures, which aren’t originally in the scope of the model.  
In the second case study [2], the applicability of the coupling approach was studied by 
performing a case study using a more complex example system, based on a fictitious reference 
model of a boiling water nuclear reactor [4]. The focus of the case study was on assessing the 
scalability of model checking when the analysis is restricted based on PRA results. The results 
of the case study demonstrated that the analysis time decreases considerably when the failure 
behaviour is restricted. PRA results were used to specify critical failure points in the system 
architecture and the failure modules were added into those positions. The limitations include 
the restricted scope and the manual labour needed to build the models. The focus is to perform 
model checking of the I&C system using a restricted set of hardware failure combinations 
selected based on PRA results, e.g. based on top 50 minimal cut sets. It is noted that it is not 
guaranteed that such a model checking analysis scope is sufficient. It is possible that individual 
failures that do not occur in the most important minimal cut sets can also, together with a 
software design error, cause potentially unsafe scenarios. However, analysing a larger set 
minimal cut sets may not be any longer practical. 
4. Comparison of model checking design issues with the failure 
mode taxonomy for PRA 
Since 2008, VTT has applied model checking in various customer projects in the Finnish 
nuclear industry [7]. By 2019, 57 I&C system design issues have been identified, in some 
cases leading to design changes. A design issue, here, means that the analysis revealed a 
practical, verifiable example of a scenario, where a certain chain of events leads to the I&C 
system ending up in a state that is contrary to a given functional requirement. The practical 
likelihood and/or safety relevance of the issues varies. 
In Table 3, the design issues identified by model checking are compared to the failure modes 
and failure effects of software modules collected from different taxonomies for PRA. The failure 
modes and failure effects of software modules were listed in Table 2. 
From the PRA modelling point of view the main interest is in the end effects of software failures. 
The end effects are dependent on the involved system, overall system architecture and 
effectiveness of fault tolerance design. The evaluation of end effects can be laborious and 
requires detailed information on the plant design. Some of the analysed models in model 
checking were not based on detailed design, but early functional design diagrams or other 
conceptual documents. For some of the issues in Table 3, detailed analysis of the plant level 
end effects was impossible due to necessary information not being available to the authors. 
In the comparison, notes on the possible end effects and their relevance to PRA modelling are 
given. These notes should be seen as examples and considered with a caveat. They are 
subjective insights to the end effects with incomplete information on the overall system 
architecture and plant design. 
A rank value is given for each design issue. The rank value estimates the difficulty to analyse 
and classify the design issue with the given taxonomy and to evaluate its possible end effects 
and relevance to PRA modelling. The availability of information influences the rank value. The 
ranking ranges from 1 (easy) to 3 (hard).  
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Table 3: Comparison of design issues found in model checking to failure modes and effects 
of software modules and notes on their possible system level end effects.  
#  Module 
type  Associated failure mode  Module level failure effect  Rank  Note on possible system level end effect(s) and relevance to PRA 
1  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  2‐out‐of‐4 voting reduced to 2‐out‐of‐3 
vote. 
2  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Control function related. Plant driven 
towards safe state. Not modelled in PRA. 
3  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Four independent failures, the following 
module will compensate. 
4  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Plant is in safe state. More analysis would 
be needed to recognize the failure mode(s) 
and potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
5  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Plant is in safe state. Test signal stored in 
delay element leads to spurious actuation. 
6  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Plant is in safe state. Test signal stored in 
memory leads to spurious actuation. 
7  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Plant level end effects unclear due to 
missing information. 
8  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Related to preventive safety function, not 
likely modelled in PRA. 
9  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Short equipment transient due to test, plant 
remains in safe state. 
10  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Specific function to prevent temporary 
failure mode in diesel startup test. Not 
modelled in PRA. 
11  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Specific function to prevent temporary 
failure mode in diesel startup. Not 
necessarily modelled in PRA. 
12  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Spurious actuation of safety function may 
lead to leak of radionuclides. More analysis 
would be needed to recognize the failure 
mode(s) and potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
13  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Spurious actuation of safety function 
reduces options for controlling accident. 
14  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Spurious actuation of safety function. Most 
likely no safety significance. 
15  EF  Output fails to 
one 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Two independent failures, the following 
module will compensate. 
16  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  2‐out‐of‐4 voting reduced to 2‐out‐of‐3 
vote. 
17  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Component protection failure may lead to 
loss of safety function later. 
18  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Failure mode relates normal operation I&C, 
which is not at the moment modelled in 
PRA. Might become relevant later, when 
normal operation I&C is included. 
19  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Indicative function fails. Not modelled in 
PRA. 
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#  Module 
type  Associated failure mode  Module level failure effect  Rank  Note on possible system level end effect(s) and relevance to PRA 
20  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Safety function can be inhibited on several 
channels by maintenance action. 
Questionable whether this would be 
modelled in PRA. 
21  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Safety function lost due to exceptional state 
of delay processing in I&C logic 
22  EF  Output fails to 
zero 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Safety function lost due to exceptional state 
of I&C logic at system (re)start. 
23  EF  Output stuck to 
the current value 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  2‐out‐of‐4 voting reduced to 2‐out‐of‐3 
vote. 
24  EF  Output stuck to 
the current value 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  2‐out‐of‐4 voting reduced to 2‐out‐of‐3 
vote. 
25  EF  Output stuck to 
the current value 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Plant presumably remains in safe state, due 
to another process criterion. 
26  EF  Output stuck to 
the current value 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Plant remains in safe state, trip signal 
cannot be reset. Likely no need for basic 
event to PRA model. 
27  EF  Output stuck to 
the current value 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Safety function actuation is permanently on, 
and plant is driven towards safe state. 
28  EF  Output fails to 
the opposite 
state 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Failure mode relates normal operation I&C, 
which is not at the moment modelled in 
PRA. Might become relevant later, when 
normal operation I&C is included. 
29  EF  Output fails to 
the opposite 
state 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
1  Plant presumably remains in safe state, due 
to process criterion request. 
30  EF  Output fails to 
the opposite 
state 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  System remains in non‐safe state after 
initiating event. 
31  EF  Delayed output  Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Preventive safety function delayed due to 
exceptional state of I&C logic at system 
(re)start. Not necessarily modelled in PRA. 
32  EF  Delayed output  Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  Safety function is delayed. Inaccuracy in 
specification regarding the delay. 
33  EF  Indecisive / 
conflicting 
output state? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  More analysis would be needed to 
recognize the safety relevance of the 
function. 
34  EF  Indecisive / 
conflicting 
output state? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Preventive function. Plant level end effects 
unclear due to missing information. 
35  EF  Indecisive / 
conflicting 
output state? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Safety function may be limited. 
36  EF  Fluctuating 
output state? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  A failure mode that might endanger a 
component protection function. Not likely 
modelled in PRA. 
37  EF  Fluctuating 
output state? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
2  A failure mode that might endanger a 
component protection function. Not likely 
modelled in PRA. 
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#  Module 
type  Associated failure mode  Module level failure effect  Rank  Note on possible system level end effect(s) and relevance to PRA 
38  EF  Incorrect control 
parameter? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Incorrect setpoint due to incorrect internal 
system state. More analysis would be 
needed to recognize the failure mode(s) and 
potential end effects(s) for PRA. 
39  EF  Incorrect control 
parameter? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Incorrect setpoint due to incorrect state 
specification for the system. More analysis 
would be needed to recognize the failure 
mode(s) and potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
40  EF  Incorrect control 
parameter? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Safety function may be limited. 
41  EF  Incorrect control 
parameter? 
Non‐fatal 
failure 
3  Safety function may be limited. 
42  N/A  N/A  N/A  2  Control function related. Not modelled in 
PRA. 
43  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Inaccuracy in specification. 
44  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Inaccuracy in specification. 
45  N/A  N/A  N/A  2  Inaccuracy in specification. 
46  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Incompleteness of specification. 
47  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Incompleteness of specification. 
48  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Incorrect internal system state. 
49  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Incorrect internal system state. 
50  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Periodic test fails, no effect on plant 
operation. 
51  N/A  N/A  N/A  2  Plant remains in safe state, exceptional 
state of I&C logic due to maintenance 
action. 
52  N/A  N/A  N/A  2  Plant remains in safe state, exceptional 
state of I&C logic during I&C system startup. 
53  N/A  N/A  N/A  3  Redundant systems can be put to test mode 
simultaneously. More analysis would be 
needed to recognize the failure mode(s) and 
potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
54  N/A  N/A  N/A  3  Redundant systems can be put to test mode 
simultaneously. More analysis would be 
needed to recognize the failure mode(s) and 
potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
55  N/A  N/A  N/A  1  Testing logic of preventive functions fails. 
Not modelled in PRA. 
56  N/A  N/A  N/A  3  Unspecified output due to incorrect internal 
system state. More analysis would be 
needed to recognize the failure mode(s) and 
potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
57  N/A  N/A  N/A  3  Unspecified output due to incorrect internal 
system state. More analysis would be 
needed to recognize the failure mode(s) and 
potential end effect(s) for PRA. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Conclusions of the previous case studies 
Based on the review of the previous case studies, the original idea of coupling model checking 
methodology with PRA focuses mainly on the needs of model checking. In the coupling 
approach, the needs of PRA are not considered. The results from PRA are used for restricting 
the model checking analysis and feedback from model checking to PRA is limited only on the 
identification of potential unknown failure scenarios, which should perhaps be included in the 
PRA model. 
The need to apply the PRA results in the coupling approach in the first place is somewhat 
unclear. If the purpose is to restrict the state space of model checking calculations, the same 
outcome can, basically, be achieved by just using information from the system architecture 
and some heuristic rules. 
From PRA needs perspective, the general idea of the coupling approach presented in 3.2 
should be revised. Model checking is basically a system’s verification method, while PRA is 
the risk model of a system. Therefore, using PRA model to support model checking can be 
challenging. The reason is twofold. The first reason, and likely the less dominant reason, is the 
different levels of abstraction in the two modelling approaches. The second reason, and likely 
the more dominant reason, is that the two modelling approaches are used for different 
objectives. 
Regarding the level of abstraction, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the most detailed level of 
abstraction considered in the PRA modelling is the module level. For many cases, even the 
module level can be too detailed from the overall PRA modelling perspective and I&C unit level 
is sufficient. In the model checking, the modelling can be performed in any abstraction level, 
all the way to the basic component level if necessary.  
Regarding the different objectives, as stated above a PRA model is essentially a model of a 
system’s failure combinations, their probabilities and their possible consequences to the 
functioning of the system and its interfacing systems. Model-checking model, on the other 
hand, is a finite state model of a system trying to identify potential failure modes for the system. 
One could state in a big picture that the PRA modelling begins from the results of model 
checking, and other similar analysis and modelling approaches. There is an inherent difference 
in the objectives of PRA and model checking models. 
It seems only rational to reverse the coupling approach of the two modelling methods, so that 
model checking is used more as the support analysis of PRA, and not opposite, as implied in 
the original coupling approach. 
5.2 Comparison of design issues with failure mode taxonomy 
The findings of model checking in various customer projects are compared to the common 
taxonomy of failure modes. The results of the comparison are shown in Table 3. For most 
findings, it was possible to associate the design issue with a software failure mode listed in 
Table 2. For the findings at the end of list, it was either difficult to relate the design issues with 
a specific failure mode or it was evident that the possible failure mode would have no relevance 
to PRA. Some of the design issues were connected to an indecisive, conflicting or fluctuating 
output state, or to an incorrect control parameter. For these design issues, new failure mode 
classes were proposed and they are marked with red colour in Table 3. As mentioned earlier, 
the original taxonomy is focused on the reliability analysis of the reactor protection system 
reducing the scope of failure modes. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, software module failure modes are directly associated with the 
software module level failure effects. In Table 2, software module failure modes which don’t 
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produce output (i.e. “hang, crash”) are labelled as fatal failures, and the other failure modes as 
non-fatal. In [3], the following description is given on the distinction of fatal and non-fatal failure 
effects: “The failure effects defined at I&C units level are the same than those defined at I&C 
modules and basic components level. A fatal failure of an I&C unit by definition affects all 
functions of the unit, and the end effect depends on the fault tolerant design. Non-fatal failure 
affects specific I&C function(s) while the others remain unaffected.” Without more detailed 
information on the system architecture and its functional allocation, the software module level 
failure effect was reduced to the produced output of a software module. 
The overall question on the comparison is how to benefit from the design issues revealed in 
model checking analysis in PRA. As discussed above, model checking aims to verify the 
correctness of design. If some inconsistency is found in model checking, the problem is 
analysed in detail and corrected if necessary. PRA model on the other hand tries to incorporate 
the potential failure modes still existing in the system. After finding and fixing a design fault of 
a system based on the model checking results, the design fault may not be relevant for PRA 
any longer. However, information on the existence, or non-existence, of design faults and the 
fixing of these faults increases our confidence on the system reliability. This confidence 
building is especially important for software. As mentioned in the introduction software failures 
are typically rare and hard to predict, therefore, model checking can provide valuable support 
in the reliability estimation of software. 
5.3 Complementary uses of modelling approaches 
The two modelling approaches share a common interest in solving the same goal, i.e. how to 
make sure a system will function safe enough in safety-critical applications, especially if the 
system embodies digital I&C. The modelling approaches also have clear connection points. 
Therefore, the question is what better complementary uses could be found for the methods. 
Due to the level of abstraction and the different objectives of the modelling approaches, it 
would be only rational to apply model checking as a support analysis for the PRA modelling. 
There are several assets model checking can provide. In [10], a feasibility study on the 
integration of PRA methods and model checking is presented. The study identifies 12 different 
approaches, or more like topics, where model checking and PRA could be coupled together. 
Potential applications are discussed below for most promising topics from the PRA 
perspective. 
5.3.1 Extraordinary and software failure modes 
One topic is the extraordinary failure modes. Model checking is an efficient method to check, 
for instance, how a faulty input signal (e.g. faulty measurement or mistimed operator action) 
can propagate through the software logic and if it can cause for example a spurious output 
signal (spurious actuation) [7]. If a spurious actuation signal is possible, FMEA can be used to 
assess how it will impact the related safety system. The performing of FMEA for a reactor 
protection system is described in Section 2.3. 
Spurious actuations are one source of possible failure modes, which can be traced with model 
checking and analysed if they should be included in the PRA model. Integration of model 
checking with FMEA could provide valuable information in the analysis of difficult and 
extraordinary failure modes.  
For the analysis of software failure modes, the model checking can be a valuable tool in with 
itself. The functions implemented in software are usually distributed between the 
microprocessors of the system. Model checking can provide a method to assess the end 
effects of the software failure modes [9]. So far in the case studies, only hardware failures have 
been considered, but software failure modes and their end effects could be analysed as well. 
This would be important for the PRA modelling purposes as explained in Section 2. The failure 
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effects listed in Table 1 and Table 2 could be verified and compared with the end effects of the 
system taking the fault tolerance design into consideration. This would help improve the 
accuracy of PRA model. 
5.3.2 Software reliability assessment 
One topic is the software reliability assessment. PRA modelling is dependent on the frequency 
and reliability estimates of the initiating events and basic events implemented to the model. 
Without realistic estimates it is questionable if certain basic events can be included in the 
model. Having plausible reliability estimates is particularly important for digital I&C systems for 
which there is only limited amount of operational data available on their functioning in the 
safety-critical application under examination. 
As introduced in Section 3.1, model checking is a computer aided automatic verification 
technique for formally verifying the correct functioning of a system design model against its 
formal specification. A model checking model is not the same thing as the system itself. It is 
an abstraction of the system. Second, the potential violation to the requirements found by the 
model checking model have to be analysed in the proper context of the analysed system in 
order to find out if such system inner state can ever be reached in practice. Third, it is up to 
the analyst to make sure that all relevant aspects of the functional requirements have been 
captured in the specified properties. Therefore, the results of model checking can’t be used 
directly as the reliability figures of the system. 
However, a model checking model can provide important evidence on the design verification 
of the system. As pointed out in [10], in the software reliability context the model checking 
verification of a piece of application software with no errors found would have a positive 
influence on the failure probability of the software. This kind of evidence could be quantified to 
a reliability estimate for example using a suitable expert judgement process. A prominent 
software reliability assessment methodology translating qualitative evidence to quantitative 
reliability estimates is for example the methodology based on Bayesian interference. Examples 
on the application of Bayesian inference methodology in the software reliability estimations are 
given in [11] and [12]. 
5.3.3 Modelling dynamic features 
One topic is the modelling of dynamic features. The state-of-the-art PRA models are generally 
static fault tree/event tree models. The modelling of dynamic, i.e. time-dependent, features in 
PRA often leads to complicated models. System repairs or implementation of flexible mitigation 
equipment are common dynamic features to be considered in the PRA modelling. System 
repairs, for example, are typically uncredited in Level 1 PRA. The main reason for this is the 
fact that separate models would be needed for different scenarios depending on the success 
of the repairs. 
Providing support for the modelling of dynamic features of PRA would be beneficial. The topic 
is discussed in [10] and [13] from the point of view of digital I&C systems. According to these 
references, the dynamic features that could be considered for digital I&C systems include, e.g., 
fault propagation, spurious function activation, modelling of priority logic and smart voting 
logics, and timing issues. Since model checking can be used to model the behaviour of digital 
I&C systems, it might be possible to utilize features of model checking in the modelling of such 
systems in PRA. 
How to make this cross-connection between the modelling approaches should be considered 
in detail before going to the actual implementation of dynamic features. References [10] and 
[13] discuss the topic only from the modelling language perspective. The fundamental 
questions, i.e. what dynamic modelling problem the cross-connection is trying to solve and 
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how the cross-connection is trying solve the problem, should be clarified before going to on 
the actual implementation. 
6. Conclusions 
Previously, two case studies on the integration of model checking method with PRA has been 
conducted. For the methods integration, a coupling approach was developed. The main idea 
of the approach was that the model checking analysis is restricted to a smaller set of postulated 
component failures, based on PRA results to improve the scalability of model checking digital 
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Based on the case study outcomes, the 
applicability of the approach is still questionable, e.g. due to somewhat limited scope. Also, the 
differences in the level of abstraction and objectives of the two modelling methods poses some 
challenges. 
The originally developed coupling approach focuses mainly on the needs of model checking. 
It would be beneficial to develop new approaches to serve better the needs of PRA and its 
taxonomy. Design issues identified by model checking in previous customer projects have 
been compared to the taxonomy. The comparison indicated e.g. a demand to increase the 
different types of software failure modes.  
The two modelling approaches share a common interest in making sure a system will function 
safe enough in safety-critical applications, especially if the system embodies digital I&C. In 
future, the research should be focused more on the complementary uses of the modelling 
methods. It would be rational to apply model checking as a support analysis for the PRA 
modelling. Potential supporting analyses and complementary uses are for example: 1) The 
identification and analysis of extraordinary failure modes, software in particular, and potential 
detection of these failure modes; 2) Software reliability assessment of important functions; 3) 
The analysis and modelling of dynamic, i.e. time-dependent, features. 
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